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ABSTRACT

Collectively, the charges and convictions of nine black youths in Scottsboro in
1931 became a symbol of corruption and oppression for those interested in reshaping
America's political and legal landscapes. Scottsboro instigated a decade of trials and
retrials, two landmark United States Supreme Court opinions, countless dramatic
interpretations, and various artistic responses. In particular, Scottsboro, Limited by
Langston Hughes and They Shall Not Die by John Wexley were cultural revisions of the
trials in 1931 and 1933, respectively. While both works supported the defendants, they
were distinguished by their form, production and ultimate statement about the meaning of
Scottsboro. These dramatic reproductions help outline a negotiation between pop-culture
and legal culture in the early years of the Great Depression. Ironically, as the legal
community showed signs of incorporating social concerns within the parameters of legal
reasoning, the cultural productions of Scottsboro grew less radical and more in line with
"mainstream America."
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I.
INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 1932, Langston Hughes arrived in Los Angles to participate in a
mass meeting for the "Scottsboro Nine," where he watched the first production of his
play, Scottsboro, Limited, 1 written just after the first trial in 1931. Propelled by Limited' s
climactic shouts of "Fight, Fight, Fight," Hughes led the working-class crowd in a
follow-up protest chant of his political poem, Tom Mooney, praising a radical accused of
a 1916 San Francisco bombing. The festivities represented the power of living poetry
and drama to incite a unified voice of protest. Two years later, John Wexley wrote
another rendition of the Scottsboro trials, They Shall Not Die, and the production also
ended in a shout; however, the united voices of audience/actor, black/white that
concluded the Hughes performance in Los Angles, were transformed into the solitary,
white, male voice of a northeastern criminal defense attorney fighting for, rather than
with, the black defendants of Scottsboro. They Shall Not Die, offered by the Guild
Theatre to a Broadway audience, marked a sharp contrast from Limited in audience, form,
and ultimately, in its interpretation of the meaning of Scottsboro.
The transformation from the "We" of Hughes to the "I" /"They" of Wexley serves
as a symbol for a broader shift in American culture between 1931 and 1934. Both plays
function as political theatre, and have ties to the radical left, but their divergent styles and
forms reveal more than a mere difference in playwright or audience; rather, the fissure
between Limited and They Shall Not Die reveals an evolution of American political
theatre, a revolution in constitutional law (from which their subject is taken), and a

1

Scottsboro, Limited will be referred to as Limited as opposed to Scottsboro in order to distinguish the play
from other uses of the word "Scottsboro" (i.e., place, trial, appellate opinions).

1

developing definition for American culture itself. The use and meaning of Scottsboro
serves as a mediator for these three seemingly disparate, but inseparable, changes.
This paper will explore the Scottsboro trials, and the American political and legal
cultures surrounding them. It will discuss the form and meaning of the two Scottsborobased plays, Limited and They Shall Not Die, and relate each to the constitutional shift
that began, in part, with the Supreme Court decision of Powell v. Alabama (1932). 2 The
trials, the appellate opinions, and the plays themselves are tied to the cultural change
spurred by the early years of the Great Depression. Ultimately, a comparison of Limited
and They Shall Not Die illustrates a conservative shift in the radical movement that arose
out of the crash of 1929 and links this shift to the liberalization of constitutional law.
This

pap~r

does not attempt to argue a cause-and-effect relationship between political

theatre and American jurisprudence, but rather argues that theatre about the law provides
a unique and powerful opportunity to explain the interconnectedness of legal and cultural
responses to social crisis. 3
This paper will be organized as follows: Part II provides a brief summary of the
Scottsboro trials and a discussion of the shifting American constitutional interpretation of
the 1930s that enabled the landmark decisions of Scottsboro; Part III discusses the
Scottsboro trials outside of the legal context and analyzes the way in which Langston
Hughes reconstructs the first set of Scottsboro trials for political theater; Part IV returns
to the law of Scottsboro, exploring the concept of trial as spectacle, linking this to
concepts of political theater, and tracing these conceptions to the Supreme Court's

2

287 U.S. 45 (1932).
For further discussion of the distinction between a "legal" and "cultural" responses, see L. Friedman
1579-93 and Yngvesson 1689-93. This paper will distinguish between "legal culture" and "popular
culture," see supra, 6-8.
3

2

decision, Powell v. Alabama; Part V addresses John Wexley's play in terms of a cultural
shift from earlier representations of Scottsboro.

3

II.

DEFINING SCOTTSBORO & CULTURE IN THE THIRTIES
Such matters really are battle grounds where the means do not exist for
determinations that shall be good for all time, and where the decision can do not
more than embody the preference of a given body in a given time and place. We
do not realize how large a part of our law is open to reconsideration upon a slight
change in the habit of the public mind.
Holmes, The Path of the Law

The Scottsboro trials began in 1931 and did not ultimately resolve until 1937;
spanning nearly the entire decade, they came to represent an emerging struggle in
constitutional law between the states and the federal government over the power to
protect the rights of individuals. The first set of trials ended in death sentences for eight
of nine defendants on the verdicts of Alabama jurors. 4 The Supreme Court overturned
these co~victions in 19325 and remanded the case for a retrial on the holding that the
defendants were tried without adequate representation. The decision was one of the first
times the Court used the Due Process Clause to overturn a state interpretation of its own
criminal procedure. 6

4

The jury convicted all 9 defendants, but could not decide on the sentencing of Roy Wright, a thirteen-year
old boy. Despite the fact that the prosecution had only asked for life imprisonment for Wright due to his
age, seven of the jurors insisted on the death penalty. Because the jury recommended death for Wright, the
judge ordered a mistrial in his case, but sentenced the remaining defendants to death (Carter 48).
5
Powell, ibid.
6
The Fourteenth Amendment was drafted by the 39th Congress in 1866 following the Civil War, and
guaranteed that no one within the jurisdiction of a state would be "deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law" (the "Due Process Clause") or denied "equal protection of the laws." Dennis
Hutchinson highlights the fact that the Due Process Clause became the "weapon" to discourage "exertions
of state authority in conflict with the fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment"
(Hutchinson 808). Lawrence M. Friedman elaborates on the nature of Due Process:
Freedom and democracy, in the minds of lawyers, in contrast with the public at large, tend to be
conceived of largely in procedural terms. Lawyers are taught and trained to regard "due process"
as the very essence of fairness and the rule of law... On the whole, the layman thinks of justice,
freedom, and democracy in markedly substantive terms. A fair trial is a nice thing; but if an
innocent person ends up with his neck in a noose, fair process is not much consolation (L.
Friedman 1603).
For further discussion of due process, the relevance of the Scottsboro decisions and the importance of
Constitutional dignity, see Baker 127-138 and Wolfram 67.

4

The first remanded Scottsboro trial took place in the summer of 1933 in Decatur,
Alabama, a town just a few miles from Scottsboro. Judge James E. Horton7 presided, and
a jury found Haywood Patterson guilty of rape and sentenced him to death. Horton threw
out the verdict holding it had no basis in fact. After granting the defendant's motion to
dismiss, Horton attempted to get the prosecutor to drop the charges for the remaining
defendants.

The prosecution refused and instead went to the Alabama legislature--

Horton was removed from further Scottsboro trials, but his decision marks a commonly
overlooked feature of many cases involving rights-that the stands taken by individual
state judges at the trial and appellate levels often laid the foundations for constitutional
change. 8
f1:orton resigned under political pressure from the Alabama legislature, 9 and was
replaced by Judge William W. Callahan (Carter 272-73). 10 The Scottsboro defendants
were once again found guilty and once again sentenced to death. The Supreme Court
once again remanded the verdicts in another landmark case, Norris v. Alabama. 11 The

Norris decision focused on the flawed jury selection procedures in Alabama and, unlike
Powell, explicitly recognized systematic racial discrimination as the root of injustice.
Nevertheless, the issue remained one of procedure, and the case was remanded for further
action by the Alabama legal system.

7

For a full discussion of Judge Horton's role in the Scottsboro trial, see Linder 549-83.
For further discussion on how state judges instigated reform of criminal justice in the Thirties and beyond,
see Lewis 575-78 and Hutchinson 807-08.
9
See Carter 269-74. Horton ended up losing his judgeship in the following election as a result of his
decision to sustain the defendant's motion to dismiss.
10
Judge Callahan, nicknamed "speedy Callahan" by reporters, did not allow the defense leeway to cross
examine the prosecution's witnesses the way Horton had allowed. In addition, Callahan made several
rulings on motions that crippled the defense, see Carter 290-303.
11
294 U.S. 587 (1935).
8

5

Undeterred by the Supreme Court's second opinion-or perhaps spurred on by
it-the state prosecutor tried the Scottsboro defendants for a final time in late 1936 and
early 1937. This time, jurors found four defendants guilty, though they sentenced them
to prison terms rather than death; in a strange twist, the prosecution agreed to drop the
charges against four others who walked out of the courtroom free men. The ninth, Ozie
Powell, was charged with a separate assault on a police officer that had occurred while in
custody. 12 To conclude the saga, the last of the Scottsboro defendants was released from
prison in 1950, nearly 20 years after the "Scottsboro Boys" were arrested. The release of
the final defendant came at the hands of a politician in the form of a pardon. What began
as a trial in a court of law ended with a political act beyond the realm of judge or jury.
The law in the Scottsboro trials had become almost completely external, guided primarily
by the political mood of Alabama and possibly America as a whole. This practice of
external forces 13 acting on the legal fate of the Scottsboro defendants was not l.imited to
the last pardon-the case went up and down the judicial system and offered ample
opportunities for judges to act, for observers to react, and for judges to act again. This
relationship between the legal community and the broader cultural community requires
further investigation in order to articulate the meaning and impact of Scottsboro on legal
and non-legal developments.
Lawrence Friedman defines and uses the terms "legal culture" and "popular
culture" to differentiate between legal and non-legal realms in his essay, "Law, Lawyers

12

In 1936, Powell slashed the throat of deputy Edgar Blalock while in transport to the Birmingham Jail.
Sheriff J. Street Sandlin, who had been driving, stopped the car and fired his pistol into the backseat, hitting
Powell in the side of his head. Miraculously, Powell survived the gun wound. The state dropped the rape
charge against Powell, but he was sentenced to 20 years by the court after pleading guilty to assault (Carter
349-50).
13 For a further explanation of the meaning of "external" with regard to law, see supra 8.

6

and Popular Culture." For Friedman, legal culture consists of "ideas, attitudes, values,
and opinions about law held by people in a society" (1579). This paper will use the term
in a more limited sense: rather than representing opinions by all people in society, "legal
culture" for our purposes will consist of the ideas, attitudes, values, and opinions held by
judges, lawyers, law professors and other members of the legal community. 14 In other
words, legal culture here will consist of the shared premises and values of decisionmakers, practitioners, and scholars schooled in the language and operation of law. As for
popular culture, Friedman defines the term in two senses: first, as the "norms and values
held by ordinary people"; second, as "works of imagination whose intended audience is
the public as a whole" (1579). This paper will use popular culture in both senses, but I
will

arg~e

that "works of imagination" (i.e., Hughes and Wexley's plays about

Scottsboro) serve as litmus for the norms and values held by ordinary Americans. 15 The
danger of these terms is that they create a clean dichotomy between popular and legal
cultures where one may not exist. In fact, Friedman's central thesis is that "social theory
must go beyond the simple-minded equation that joins together particular social and legal
events or changes, and find a process or mechanism that actually links the two together"
(1583). Before discussing the way in which the Scottsboro case became a kind of process
linking social and legal events of the 1930s, one must question whether the legal and
social really exist in separate spheres in the first place.

14

Babara Yngvesson uses the term "legal elite" to describe those who are legal professionals, see
Yngvesson 1691-92.
15
This is not to argue that Hughes and Wexley's plays represent the majority views of Americans during
the 1930s. Following Warren I. Susman, I will make the point later in the paper that Americans became
self-conscious of the very concept of popular culture in the 1930s, and that an important part of this selfconsciousness grew out of the work of poets and scholars with liberal sympathies. Hughes and Wexley's
plays are representative works of the era, and thus serve as one avenue into understanding the nature of the
popular culture.

l_________

7

Law professor Barry Friedman writes, "We expect judges will decide cases based
on the facts and existing precedents, rather than on the preferences of those in power" (B.
Friedman 148). This expectation is derived from the ideal of impartiality in a court of
law. The notion of impartiality manifests itself allegorically through the image of Justice,
operating under blindfold and through the objective process of the balancing of scales:
"any notion that law is legitimate when it meets with public approval, and illegitimate
otherwise, seems to threaten the notion of the rule of law, and the separation of law and
politics." (B. Friedman 1060). The argument continues that law has, and must maintain,
a degree of autonomy, and that when reviewing interpretations of the law, we should not
substitute "the language of political science" for the "legal language" of judicial opinions
(Cushma~- 206).

Historian Duncan Kennedy finds:

legal consciousness [is] an entity with a measure of autonomy . . . a set of
concepts and intellectual operations that evolves according to a pattern of its own,
and exercises an influence on results distinguishable from those of political power
and economic interest (qtd. in Cushman 256).
Yet, there is something wanting in the image of Justice, blindfolded and operating
scales in some autonomous realm of legal consciousness. As law professor Moglen
writes, "Neither a purely intemalist nor a purely extemalist perspective will produce the
most plausible narrative reconstruction of our constitutional tradition" (274-75). The
question becomes one of degree. How much of an extemalist perspective should we
allow when attempting to understand the nature of historical legal events such as the
Scottsboro trials? The answer would seem to depend on the nature of the particular legal
event that we are trying to understand.

For example, appellate opinions are quite

different modes of legal production than trials; in addition, certain trials are "more
political" than other trials, creating a greater impetus, and perhaps thus potential, for

8

outside influence. The beauty of Scottsboro as a source of study is that over its six-year
run it incorporated appellate opinions and legal trials, political questions and questions of
law, internal arguments and external works of art. Not only was Scottsboro a product of
the Thirties, it helped develop the Thirties. To understand how this was achieved, one
must explore in greater depth and with greater particularity the nature of "popular
culture" and "legal culture" during that decade.
For historians Warren I. Susman and Michael Denning, the notion that popular
culture in America merited serious attention as a point of discussion and of academic
scholarship blossomed during the era of the Great Depression. 16

For example, the

publication of Ruth Benedict's book in 1934, Patterns of Culture, popularized the notion
that cultural patterns could be analyzed both as particular phenomena and as causes of
individual behavior (cited in Susman 153). The cultural shift in America in the early
twentieth century can be measured by the rise of organized labor, the development of
mass entertainment, the fallout from the economic crash of 1929, and reactions to the
growing threat of Fascism (Denning 4-5; Susman 153).

As the country struggled

economically through the Great Depression, American institutions were reorganized to
facilitate governmental systems of support (Susman xx-xxi). With the development of
mass bureaucracy came technological advancements that facilitated the widespread
distribution of means of mass communication such as radio. Susman argues that both the
developments in communication and the nationalization of goods and services helped

16

This paper adopts Susman's position that the Thirties marked a radical shift in the understanding of
American popular culture. In addition, Denning's ideas concerning the consistency of the "cultural front"
are used to examine the nature of the legal culture of the time. While Denning mentions both the Hughes
and Wexley plays, he does not discuss them in any detail. Furthermore, Denning does not connect the
plays to their legal counterpart productions. Susman discusses neither the plays nor the legal climate of the
Thirties.

9

mold a "special community of all Americans," increasing cultural awareness by creating
a unity of response and action: "In this connection, it is possible to see how these
developments also heightened a growing interest among social and political thinkers in
the role of symbol, myth, and rhetoric" (Susman 160).
The recognition and advancement of cultural patterns, as identified by Susman,
facilitated a popular culture during the Depression era that manifested itself through
Scottsboro: "Besides unemployment and poverty, the Scottsboro case became the most
important issue in the eyes of America's left-wing activists" (Cosgrove 201). 17 The
spread of the Scottsboro "issue" was facilitated by the spread of mass communication
described above, and also by the ability of activists to use Scottsboro as a rallying point
through "~ymbol, myth, and rhetoric." From a cultural point of view in terms of movies,
visual art, poems, plays and the like, Scottsboro proved a furious muse. 18 Artist Loin Shi
Khan and author Toni Perez depicted the Scottsboro trials through a series of linoleum
cuts in 1931, beginning with the rape of Africa, depicting black Americans on the trains
of mass production and ending their journey in the jails of Alabama (Khan 1-16).
Langston Hughes not only wrote Limited in 1931, but published several poems of protest
for New Masses and other left-leaning journals on the subject from 1931 to 1935. The
Workers Film and Photo League created the film, Scottsboro (Denning 56); 19 in 1933, the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) published a oneact play in their journal, The Crises, titled It Might have Happened in Alabama (Crises

17

As Denning argues, the cultural front guided artistic productions of popular culture throughout the
Thirties, and emerged from an avant-garde, radical backdrop, see 64-65.
18
Hugh Murray argues that literature about the Scottsboro trials has served as a kind of pulse for the state
of the nation. Rather than focusing on the Thirties, Murray does a broad sweep of the thirties, fifties,
sixties and seventies (82).
19
The film is lost, though records of it still exist. For discussions on the work and influence of the Film
and Photo League, see generally Alexander and Campbell.
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227). The influential American-based agitprop theater troupe, Prolet Buehne, produced a
play in the German language in 1931 titled Scottsboro.

John Wexley's play for

Broadway recreated one of the Scottsboro trials in 1934 from the trial transcripts.
Collectively, these and other responses were part of a larger "cultural formation" of the
early to mid-Thirties, defined as "that union of an artistic form and a social location"
(Denning 229). As such, these artistic productions became "part of the mythology of the
United States, part of the national-popular imagination" (229).

Specifically, artists

looked to Scottsboro as a way of challenging the dominant social institutions capable of
perpetuating injustices by reformulating the narrative of the trial.
What is particularly fascinating about the Great Depression is that the social
institution ·of law was simultaneously reformulating its own narrative in terms of
constitutional interpretation.

From the point of view of legal theory, American

jurisprudence was primed to develop sensitivity to social change by the school known as
the American New Realists. Some of the more influential New Realists included the
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., drafter of the U.C.C. Karl Llewellyn,
20

and the legal theorist Jerome Frank (Tebbit 22).

According to Philosopher Mark

Tebbit, the New Realists were most influential during the Twenties and Thirties, 21 and
were held together by the belief that theories of justice had moved too far from the way in
which law was actually practiced (Tebbit 22).

20

They viewed the courtroom and the

Uniform Commercial Code. The U.C.C. has been adopted in some form by every state in the United
States. Article 1 of the U.C.C. contains general provisions that operate for the entire code. One of
Llewellyn's contributions to this article was to allow for commercial business transactions as they actually
occurred, without the burden of formulaic considerations such as the placement of seals that would foil an
otherwise legitimate "meeting of the minds." In other words, the idea was to incorporate "real world"
business practices when interpreting the legal meaning of contracts.
21
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and John Chipman Gray initiated the movement at the turn of the century.
Karl Llewellyn, Jerome Frank and Judge Joseph Hutcheson published throughout the 1930s, see Tebbit 2223.
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presiding judge as the central source for law rather than some universal natural law. 22
However, unlike empirical theorists, 23 the New Realists were willing to acknowledge the
connection between morality and legality. Thus, New Realist Jerome Frank argued that
law was formulated by the conscious exercise of judicial discretion with regard to
individualized cases (Frank 141).

Likewise, Justice Holmes wrote that "judges

themselves have failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of
social advantage" (Holmes 40). By considering the "social advantage" as part of legal
reasoning, the New Realists made the argument for the court's role as a medium for
social change. Once the argument was made, it took the crash of 1929 and subsequent
New Deal legislation to test its implications.
T~~- New Deal promised to inspire faith in federal institutions and stimulate the

economy, but was consistently scuttled during Roosevelt's first term (1933-1937) by
Supreme Court decisions narrowly construing the federal government's ability to regulate
in areas traditionally controlled by the states. 24 In 1937, the Court reversed itself through

NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 25 upholding the pro-labor Wagner Act by
reformulating the meaning of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution: Laughlin Steel

22

Natural law is "a system of legal and moral principles purportedly deriving from a universalized
conception of human nature or divine justice rather than from legislative o_r judicial action" (Black's 1049).
23
In general, positivists followed the empirical philosophical traditions of Locke and Hume and rejected an
intrinsic nature of law beyond what humans constructed. Thus, John Austin argued against conceptions of
natural law in favor of a conception of law as rules "laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by
an intelligent being having power over him." With this claim came the idea that law was morally neutral
(qtd in Tebbit 34).
24
In the famous case dubbed the "Sick Chicken," the Court struck down the minimum wage/maximum
hour requirements of Roosevelt's National Industrial Recovery Act: "Extraordinary conditions may call for
extraordinary remedies. But the argument necessarily stops short of an attempt to justify action which lies
outside the sphere of constitutional authority" (ALA Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935)). The decision of United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), destroyed an Agriculture Adjustment
Act tax meant to balance production and consumption of agricultural commodities, and Carter v. Carter
Coal, 298 U.S. 238 (1936), affirmed "Sick Chicken," holding that Congress could only regulate industries
that had a direct, not indirect, effect on the economy.
25
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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essentially allowed the federal government to set minimum wage and maximum hours
standards. What is not immediately obvious is that this shift in the interpretation of the
Commerce Clause was facilitated by the Court's earlier decisions in Scottsboro.
Hutchinson describes the process whereby the Supreme Court finally acted against the
"stench" of Jim Crow:
One petition for certiorari after another recounted allegations of coerced
confessions, casual brutality in custody, manufactured evidence and juror
misconduct. Yet case after case was precluded from review by procedural
default, inept counsel or no counsel at all. Scottsboro and Brown v. Mississippi26
were the Supreme Court's vehicles for condemning a system whose corruption
was evidenced daily.
(Hutchinson 808)

Scottsboro marked a sea change in legal culture. As Edward Purcell notes, due process
and Com!Ilerce Clause jurisprudence were intertwined and "their relationship generated
an internal potential . . . for sanctioning substantial increases in governmental regulatory
powers" (Purcell 281). In other words, once the federal judiciary found the constitutional
authority to interrupt state power for purposes of civil rights, it was reasonable and
perhaps inevitable that the Court would allow federal regulation of commerce that was
once solely within the realm of the states. 27 These specific constitutional interpretations
of the 1930s were the "seeds of the constitutional revolution we identify with the 1950s
and 1960s" (Hutchinson 807).
Near the tum of the 201h century Justice Holmes wrote, "We do not realize how
large a part of our law is open to reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of the
public mind" (49). Thirty years later, the legal and popular culture of America underwent
26

297 U.S. 278 (1936). Brown invalidated convictions of black tenant farmers who had confessed to the
murder of a white planter after several rounds of brutal whippings.
27
Moglen follows this line of argument, stating that "the legal history of the New Deal is the story of
wholesale change in personnel and organizational technology, as-in perfect Marxian theory-the
quantitative changes in the government legal sector became qualitative ones" (270).

13

sweeping changes, and Scottsboro became a medium through which the law and the
"public mind" intersected.

The importance of Scottsboro was due, in part, to the

newfound self-consciousness of popular culture that developed in the 1930s that took into
consideration the nation's relationships with social institutions and, in part, to the
application of ideas championed by American New Realists that argued for a system of
law recognizing the judiciary's role in instituting social change. 28 With this conception
of legal and popular culture of the 1930s in place, we will tum now to Langston Hughes's
Limited to explore the specific relationship between this piece of popular culture, the

legal culture from which it derived, and the play's possible effect on subsequent legal
episodes.

28

For a discussion on the idea of popular legal culture and the influence of local setting on law in recent
decades, see Yngvesson 1689-93.
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III.
AGITATION AND GOOD VIBRATION:
HUGHES'S POLITICAL SCOTTSBORO
The legal system invests, inhabits, and flows out of the same society that produces
and sustains popular culture. That society has its structure, its traditions, its
norms and ideologies. In society, there are general ideas about right and wrong,
about good and bad; these are templates out of which legal norms are cut, and
they are also ingredients from which song- and script-writers craft their themes
and plots. As general social norms shift over time, themes of the legal systems
shift with them; and so too of popular culture. Art, sub-art, and law move in
parallel directions-more or less (L. Friedman 1589).
Hughes wrote Limited in 1931, only a few months after the convictions and death
sentences were handed down from the first Scottsboro trial. Hughes's mediation between
"race" and "labor" allows his play to move beyond a simple agitprop slogan both
structurally and thematically. If the New Realists were arguing for legal culture to
.
acknowledge the role of the shifting "public mind," Hughes's Limited was an effort in
expanding that public mind, the popular culture, to recognize Jim Crow, to condemn the
exploitation of labor, and to specifically free the Scottsboro defendants. 29 Before the
Supreme Court had made the connection between due process and the Commerce Clause,
between individual liberty and federal regulation of private mega-corporations like Jones
& Laughlin Steel, Limited made the connection aesthetically and thematically using

political theatre to express a desire for change within what has been termed America's
"cultural front. "30

29

For further discussion of techniques used by Hughes in his works for theatre, see Sanders 4-11. Sanders
argues that Hughes was heavily influenced by productions he saw when he traveled to the Soviet Union in
the mid-thirties; however, Limited was written before his trip to Russia, and many of the qualities that
Sanders attributes to Hughes' travels-formal experimentation, use of folk forms, incorporation of
rhythms-were already evident in Limited. While a discussion of Hughes's trip to Russia is outside the
scope of this paper, the relationship between Hughes and dramatists such as Meyerhold and Oklopkov
deserves further exploration-perhaps there was more of a dialogue than Sanders suggests.
30 "The cultural front was a common metaphor of the time, combining two meanings of the word 'front':
the military metaphor designating a place, a site of struggle or battlefront; and the political metaphor
designating a group, a coalition with a common purpose. Thus, the 'cultural front' referred both to the

15

The first image of Limited is of "eight BLACK BOYS, chained by the right foot"
(Limited 117, capitalization the author's). Black bondage begins the action: before any

words are uttered, race literally takes center stage: "As they approach the middle of the
house ... the WHITE MAN rises in the audience" (117, capitalization author's). Despite
the presence of the Scottsboro defendants at the play's genesis, Hughes gives the white
man the first speaking role. In the first few lines, the audience is exposed to the nameless
Man's shouts, his demands of the "Boys" to stop talking, and his racial slur, e.g., "you
coon!" (117). But the "Boys" are not silenced-they "speak poetry," and they physically
displace the Man who must sit "jauntily on the edge of stage" (ibid. 117). In other words,
the play serves as a kind of blueprint for subversion.
S1:1san Duffy astutely points out that the collective protagonists do not simply
form a faceless mass protest, but that Hughes "maintains the individuality of the
Scottsboro defendants with lines revealing their individual ethos" (28). 31 She further
notes that the white actor plays multiple roles and thus becomes "the entire white race"
melded into a single white face. Yet, as the Boys move to center stage, there is a subtle
shift in focus from the white/black dialectic: "Not supposed to read or write," the Man
says, "You work better without it" (Limited 11 7). This moment signals a variation from
the original racial "ground beat." The variation is rooted in the first image of the playthe chain gang of Black Boys that refers the audience/reader to the image of slavery, of a
slave economy, and of what Hughes views as the root of racial oppression: cheap labor.

cultural industries and apparatuses-a 'front' or terrain of cultural struggle-and to the alliance of radical
artists and intellectuals who made up the 'cultural' part of the Popular Front" (Denning xix).
31
Duffy's article is an introduction to Limited given in her anthology of Hughes's political plays. As such,
the main point of her article is to give the reader background on the writing and production of the play.
Duffy does a limited critique of Limited, focusing mainly on its source as agitprop.
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The oscillation between racial and economic strife propels the play forward.
Hughes' s merger of the two social issues with regard to Scottsboro contains implicit
historical tensions that give the play increasing urgency. For one, the accusers in the
Scottsboro trials were white laborers. The two women traveled the rails to a neighboring
town to supplement their income as mill workers.

In addition, Hughes's play was

produced at a time when the very public battle for representation of the Scottsboro
defendants was heating up between the Marxist ILD and the NAACP. 32 The Association,
slow to come to the defense of the Scottsboro defendants, 33 eventually condemned the
ILD in its struggle to wrest control of the case. Walter White, executive secretary for the
Association, went so far as to point out that the ILD was a "working class mob of whites"
who waqted to lynch the defendants when they were first arrested (Carter 93), thus
severing the efforts of the white laborers as represented by the ILD from the interests of
black Americans.
Finally, the conflict between racial efforts and labor efforts touched Hughes
personally, as he had ties to both camps. His father, Rev. F.A. Cullen, supported the
NAACP's rejection of the ILD, holding a mass meeting in competition to a Communist
rally in June of 1931; White, himself, had served as a mentor for Hughes (Rampersad
218). However, Hughes was also actively involved in the John Reed Club, the American
32

While the ILD made a point of representing black defendants, their mode of agitation was tied to the
Communist party with the ultimate goal of mobilizing the working class: "ILD officers professed
independence from the Communist Party, but this was only a convenient fiction which aided in the
recruitment of prominent non-Communists to the national committee" (Carter 66-67). Thus, the ILD was
tied to Stalin's "Third Period" where the duty of international Communist parties was to "take the offensive
in demonstrations, strikes, and-ultimately-revolution" (Carter 64). The NAACP, on the other hand, was
concerned primarily with the social advancement of black Americans, rather than a working class
revolution, and relied on its traditional base of conservative black ministers and church members.
(Rampersad 216).
33
"The last thing they wanted was to identify the Association with a gang of mass rapists unless they were
reasonably certain the boys were innocent or that their constitutional rights had been abridged" (Carter 5253).
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Negro Labor Congress, and other groups that leaned to the left (Duffy 25). Rampersad
writes of Hughes in the early 30's: "he was becoming at least three different writersradical, as in the New Masses; commercial, as in the Kaj Gynt musical; and genteel, if
also racial, as in the poems proposed to Prentiss Taylor" (Rampersad 221). Writing about
Scottsboro required Hughes to wear all three hats, but more importantly, Scottsboro
offered Hughes an opportunity to connect politically disparate racial and labor issues that
he saw as fundamentally linked.
The effort of formulating a blueprint for subversion in the dual realm of race and
labor is articulated in the very structure of Limited. At its most basic, Limited is an
agitprop piece. If the cultural front began as an avant-garde culture as Denning suggests,
the form _of agitprop was the primary medium for its early revolutionary expression as
participant Earl Robinson exclaimed:
We took it out on the goddamn streets ... Agitprop, that was an honourable word.
We never even thought of anything else in the world except that, agitation and
propaganda (qtd. in Denning 66).
During his "communist years," which ran from the commencement of the Scottsboro case
in 1931 and ended with the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, Hughes argued that the black artist
should write functional literature-a literature committed to "discernible action" (Jemie
105). In general, the structure of agitprop plays was designed to create in the audience
just such a "discernible action" (Duffy 26). Techniques to mobilize viewers included
planting actors in the audience to shout reactions, demonizing the opposition to create a
sense of solidarity among viewers, and "a conclusion that prompts the audience to rise in
mass, shouting slogans or singing songs" (Duffy 26-27).
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More than mere mobilization, agitprop was specifically designed to disseminate
Marxist propaganda (Cosgrove 201). The German-speaking Prolet Buehne ushered in a
brief explosion of agitprop companies and performances in the early 30s.34

The

Communist party established other groups in New York for the sole purpose of producing
agitprop plays (Duffy 27). 35 As Stuart Cosgrove argues, agitprop was the vehicle for
Marxism in the same way that mystery plays were the vehicle for Christianity in the
Middle Ages: "It presented class issues in a clear-cut, indisputable manner and simplified
political theory for an audience who were often illiterate or uneducated" (202). Limited
is just such a Marxist "morality play," designed to instigate action. In her introduction to
the play, Susan Duffy imagines the actors designated as racist "Mob Voices" and prodefendant "Red Voices" battling verbally amid the viewing audience until the Reds
prevail and join hands both on and off the stage. The final shouts of "Fight!" are
reinforced by a rendition of "The Internationale" and a red flag that descends from above
(Duffy 28).
But the strength of agitprop-its ability to present a clear-cut, unambiguous
message--is also the form's greatest limitation. As the name suggests, it is an instrument
of agitation rather than subversion.

Even radical reviewers of the Prolet Buehne's

agitprop productions recognized the limitations of the form as a means for social reform.

The Partisan Review, for example, published an essay entitled "Problems and
Perspectives in Revolutionary Literature," in which the authors warned against the form's
tendency to simplify and polarize:
34

Under the leadership of Hans Bohn, the theatre troupe that had facilitated social gatherings for a small
community of German immigrants was transformed into an activist group whose productions of agitprop
thrived in America following the crash of 1929 (Cosgrove 201-02).
35
Such groups multiplied in number in America from around 200 in 1931 to a peak of over 400 in 1933
(Cosgrove 207, 210).
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The measure of a revolutionary writer's success lies not only in his sensitiveness
to proletarian material, but also in his ability to create new landmarks in the
perception of reality; that is, his success cannot be gauged by immediate
agitational significance, but by his recreation of social forces in their entirety.
(Phelps 185)
As suggested earlier, Hughes was playing a subtle balancing game between racial and
labor issues in Limited. The force of the agitprop form speeds Limited to its fiery, prolabor conclusion-the last spectacle of Communist song, color, and voice structurally
satisfies the agitprop Marxist agenda; however, the "ground beat" of racial oppression
ultimately remains, giving the production an extra dimension. Rather than simply taking
to the "goddamned streets," as exclaimed by Robinson above, Limited surges beyond
Marxist materialism and into something more transcendent-a kind of universal thump
existing !Jeyond the economic and physical limitations that plague the defendants and
workers alike.
American vernacular musical form and substance become the tools by which
Hughes wrenches the subjects of his one-act play from the reduction of single-tracked
propaganda to a more ambiguous work of art. 36 Hughes first uses poetry and music to
build solidarity among the characters at the beginning of Limited.

One of the first

commands of Man to the Boys is to "Stop talking poetry and talk sense" (117). The line
is a subtle reference to the perceived disconnect between the world of popular culture,
36

Hughes's use of music in his poetry has been thoroughly explored by Larry Scanlon and Lynette ReiniGrandell. Scanlon argues that Hughes uses music in his poetry not only as an aesthetic model, but to
"redefine the very nature of cultural expression itself" (511). This paper borrows heavily from Scanlon's
explanation of rhythm in Hughes' s poetry in order to explore the particular use of rhythm in Limited.
While Scanlon focuses on poetry, this paper is interested in looking the implications of music in the
dramatic setting. Reini-Grandell examines the paradox of using the vernacular for black artists-Hughes in
particular-during the 1920s and 30s. On the one hand, the vernacular allowed the Black artist to expand
in ways that could "dismantle the status quo" (114). On the other hand, the some feared conceptions of
"primitivism" threatened to undermine the social progress of Black Americans by perpetuating stereotypes
(Ibid.). Finally, Joseph McLaren explores the use of music in Hughes' Gospel Plays. While McLaren
studies Hughes's drama, he focuses exclusively on plays written after 1950, and limits his discussion to the
influence of gospel music rather than jazz or blues.
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symbolized by the defendants, and the world of cold law, symbolized by figures of
authority in the law. Later, Hughes describes his stage directions in musical terms,
building on this dichotomy: "The trial is conducted in jazz tempo: the white voices
staccato, high and shrill; the black voices deep as the rumble of drums" (121). In blues,
this structure is called the "ground beat" (the black voices) and the "melodic line" (the
white staccato)-a defining characteristic of the blues (Scanlon 526). This ground beat
structure highlights the musical elements of Hughes' style in Limited.

In terms of

propaganda, the musicality of Limited provides an additional stimulus to guide the
audience's perception and facilitate the agitprop goal. This "phenomenal fusion" was not
particular to Hughes-the Marxist Berlin theater of the 1920s regularly juxtaposed
"satire, qnisic, jazz-gymnastics, acrobatics and propaganda" (Cosgrove 202). However,
Hughes's specific structural use of black vernacular music to facilitate tense racial/labor
thematic undertones created a new twist on the dominant proletarian politics of agitprop:
"the grounding the blues offers the black working class is not some unchanging stability
but an unending process of give and take, of rupture producing continuity, an abiding
source of transformative energy" (Scanlon 526-27).
Thus, the white man's early utterance to silence the poetry of the Boys represents
the larger "silencing" of the disempowered, facilitated by events like the Scottsboro trials.
The command continues the repression of Black voices in favor of the contradictory and
racist testimonies of the two white women claiming rape. The fact that they are known
collectively as the "Scottsboro Boys" reaffirms their collapsed identities and
voicelessness. This is a point not lost on Hughes who adds "Limited" to his title, not
only as a reference to the train from which the defendants were dragged, but also
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indicating the nature of justice and voice that these defendants can expect from their
ordeals. More than representing silencing, though, the command to stop speaking poetry
is an ironic testament to the power of poetry. This is the weapon the defendants will use
throughout the play to expand their shrinking spaces, to subvert the dominant voice of
authority and to reclaim their destinies: "We won't argue with you. I tonight there's I too
much else to do" (Limited 117).
The invocation of musical form, established early in the play, reverberates by the
time the trial begins. The judgment of the defendants is put together like a jazz piece.
Thurston recognizes that Hughes "employs an almost incantatory repetition at crucial
moments, especially the trial, to highlight white fabrication of a racist 'truth"' <Limited
8). Thu_r~ton supports this statement by pointing out the dialogue between the judge and
the defendants where each defendant singularly denies having raped the girls. "No" is
repeated 8 times, and then followed by a question/answer from judge to accusers who
insist they were raped: "The single line successfully overcomes the defendants' repeated
answer" <Limited 8). In terms of the blues structure, the melodic line (the accusers)
threatens to usurp the ground beat (the defendants). However, Hughes maintains the
rhythm, reinforcing the ground beat and thus the cause of the oppressed over the "white
fabrication."

However, the scene implodes when the mob, playing in the audience,

shouts, "Kill the niggers!" The mob is then joined by the defendants themselves, who
shout, "Kill the niggers!" collapsing the ground beat and the melodic line. Though they
have joined the mob, the defendants circle to destroy the symbol of oppression-the
electric chair.
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It is crucial that the chair is threatened, but not destroyed, at this point in the play.

Up through the trial, the play has not fully integrated the racial struggle with labor's fight.
Early on, as mentioned above, Hughes articulates the common threat to both race and
labor, but it is not until the Boys fail to destroy the electric chair that he begins to
formulate a united solution to that threat. Once the trial concludes, the "Murmur of Red
Voices" begins in the audience: "We'll fight for you, boys. We'll fight for you." (Limited
123). At this point, the audience is transformed from hanging jury to fighting Reds, and
Hughes states what is by now the obvious point of the play: "Not just black-white and
black" (Limited 124).
Despite the triumphant smashing of the electric chair that follows the union of
Black

a~d

Red, Hughes's merger of race and labor is tenuous at best. Always, the

rhythm of his poetry and choreography threaten to overpower any stabilizing force or
effort on the part of the group. The Boys themselves are clearly shown to have limited
control of their freedom, as demonstrated by the hanging judge, the chains, and the need
for outside help. Powerlessness is reiterated by the "link" between the chains of bondage
and the chain of freight cars carrying product across the country. The freight train
symbolizes the mass industrial culture, shuttling nameless goods from town to town, from
factory to factory, from place of production to place of consumption.

The Boys-

nameless themselves-are·caught up in this machinery of production. It is fitting that the
Boys meet their accusers on this commodity shuttle. For Hughes, the chain and the train
are one in the same.
Furthermore, there is an irony here because the trial and the breaking of the chair
are both given in flashback. This pushes the introduction of the play temporally later
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than the hopeful utterance, "Fight," that actually concludes the play. As such, there is a
certain ambiguity in the agitprop ending. Yes, the Boys have received aid from the Reds,
but their plight threatens to continue despite the help. Aid chums constantly back into the
culture of formless production, undermining the possibility of having an individual voice
and thus a true "day in court." In other words, the individual rights of the defendants
seem appropriated by the white laborers whose primary interest is in the "fight," and who
have only a secondary interest in the freedom of the defendants.
Does this ambiguity create in Hughes' s Limited the ability to escape the trap of
agitprop mentioned above? In other words, does musical structure really move the play
from purely material themes to spiritual ones? After all, the musical structure of Limited
is finally -reduced to an orchestrated singing of "The Internationale." The vernacular
music that Hughes seems to promote by creating the blues-structured ground beat and
melodic line tension is ultimately reduced to a musically uninteresting37 chant of political
propaganda: "Debout les damnes de la terre I Debout les for9ats de la faim ... Le monde
va changer de base I Nous ne sommes rien, soyons tout" (Pottier). The answer to this
question is found in the rhythm that underscores the entire production of Limited.
For Hughes, rhythm is more than simply a useful structural technique-it is a
means of resistance and a symbol for perseverance.

Larry Scanlon points out that
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Hughes employs rhythm in his poetry as both an "actual residue of an originary past"
and, more importantly, as a "self-conscious reconstruction in the present" (517). Despite
the loose allegiance of the vernacular musicians to changing the political status quo, 38
jazz and blues certainly served to revolutionize American music and thus American
popular culture. Furthermore, the very idea of rhythm functions beautifully as the central
adhesive for the multiple aspects of Scottsboro because it is a mode articulated as much
by the gaps between beats as the beats themselves. The invocation of rhythm is a tacit
acknowledgement of the reliance of the "voice" on the "voiceless," the powerful on the
powerless. Scanlon's insightful essay on the paradox of Hughes's musical influences
articulates the use of rhythm in cultural terms:
:Rhythm for Hughes is nothing less than an alternate mode of cultural articulation:
material, embodied, oral, musical . . . [R]hythm's persistence within AfricanAmerican culture as its ultimate source of continuity has as much to do with
conditions of white oppression as with its African origins. White slave-owners
successfully severed that culture's linguistic ties to Africa, displacing African
languages ... As that part of African culture not directly dependent on language,
African musical traditions proved more durable. This durability exposes a
blindness which Hughes's broadened notion of rhythm attempts to illuminate.
(Scanlon 518)

Rhythm is more than simply a symbol within Limited-rhythm is the actual non-verbal
articulation of spirit, conjuring the strength of survival in support of unity among

38

Rhythm found in vernacular American music formed one of the many instruments of organization for the
Popular Front. Hughes himself helped organize a benefit for the Scottsboro Nine that featured the jazz
bands of Benny Carter and Fletcher Henderson, using music to raise money for the defendants.
Furthermore, the benefit was put together with the help of Louise Thomson, who later married an ILD
lawyer and was instrumental in creating American dance and music events as well as a Marxist study group
(Denning 334). But while music had vast potential for organization, its power was not limited to the
service the Popular Front. Denning points out that jazz musicians themselves rarely subscribed to or
promoted a particular political stance or radical ideology: "As virtually all the memoirs and interviews
make clear, the jazz musicians were primarily interested in their craft, and their 'political' statements
usually dealt with injustices faced by musicians, the day-to-day exploitation, petty tyrannies, and color line
of the music industry" (333).
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individual members of the audience while simultaneously subverting any claims of
authority-including that of Marxist ideology-over the "voices" of the defendants and
the audience members alike. Rhythm provides the structural and thematic means by
which Limited might "go beyond" the basic form of agitprop.
This reading does not mean that Limited is politically ambivalent. While the form
and meaning of Limited move beyond traditional agitprop to include the dynamic
negotiations between race and labor, the play is ultimately tied to its subject-the
defendants of Scottsboro.

Like an appellate opinion, Limited ultimately makes a

judgment on the legitimacy of the trials themselves. Limited flows both from the body of
productions of the cultural front of the early 1930s and from the legal cultural production,
i.e., the first Scottsboro trials.
Ronald Sokol argues that "what is involved in the genuine political trial is not a
mere devaluation of the legal currency but an outright rejection of it, a refusal to accept it
as good specie" (Sokol 507). The first Scottsboro trials were not political trials in this
sense because they were readily accepted by the local community in which they were
decided. Instead, the trials were viewed as unusual, 39 but not completely beyond the
norm for Jim Crow. In addition, the defendants were not "political" in the sense that they
attempted to "use the courtroom as a stage to dramatize [their] views" (Sokol 500-01).
However, news of the Scottsboro convictions and death sentences spread quickly: "across
the nation, dozens of 'workers' organizations' ... sent messages of protest to Governor
Miller [of Alabama] and court officials" (Carter 49-50). Limited helped formulate the
social protest against Scottsboro; it semiotized the "we" that turned the local rape trial of
39

"In what he intended as a postscript to his story, the correspondent for the Birmingham Age-Herald
remarked that the sentencing of eight persons to death on the same day for the same crime was 'without
parallel in the history of the nation, and certainly in Alabama"' (Carter 48-49).
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Scottsboro into a political trial for the nation. As noted at the beginning of this section,
L. Friedman argues that "[a]s general social norms shift over time, themes of the legal

systems shift with them" (1589). He continues, "Art, sub-art, and law move in parallel
directions" (1589). Limited suggests that art and law are sensitive to general social shifts,
but that they do not necessarily move in parallel directions. In fact, Limited and the first
Scottsboro trial form more of a dialectic. In the Hegelian sense, such dialectic would
instigate some kind of synthesis. The next section of this paper will turn to Powell v.
Alabama, which critically reviewed Scottsboro and came on the heels of Hughes's play,

and the social movement his play represented. The "we" of Scottsboro is the spiritual
"we" of the cultural front; it would be followed by the institutional "we" of the Supreme
Court-_ail entirely different "we" altogether.
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IV.
FROM STAGE TO PAGE:
THE SUPREME COURT AS CRITIC
Political protest is placed in the liminal zone between reality and spectacle, being
not only an expression of certain political demands but also a countercultural
event (Jestrovic 42).
Silvija Jestrovic's illuminating essay on political protest in Serbia as theatre
recognizes a "liminal zone between reality and spectacle" (Jestrovic 42). Jestrovic's
description for political protest can be applied to the legal trial-ironically like protests,
the trial, too, exists "between reality and spectacle." Having illustrated the review of
Scottsboro by the cultural front via Limited, this section turns to the legal culture's review
of the trial, which by the time it reached the Court in Powell, had itself become a political
trial, a~-~ ·thus a kind of political theatre.
Milner Ball taps into the idea of trial as spectacle. Ball contends that, unlike the
production of goods, neither the performance of a play nor the live presentation of a case
to a judge or jury can be streamlined. Nor should we try. While the verdict is essential
for justice, "The live presentation of cases in the courtroom, although a means to the end
of judgment, is also an end in itself" (Ball 82). The elements of space, audience and
staging essential to theater are also essential to the ultimate dispensing of justice. In his
essay, "The Play's the Thing," Ball creates a paradigm for examining the dramatic
elements of a court of law. I will take a moment to outline these three elements and their
relationship to the first set of Scottsboro trials.
For Ball, the space of a courtroom creates a "dramatic aura" (83). The costuming
and the ceremony of courtroom procedures become integral pieces of this space. Nunn,
another critic interested in the dramatics of trial, argues that the "imposing architectural
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designs" and "symbols of state authority and power" create a distinct atmosphere (78283). For Nunn, this space is dictated by the state, thus giving the prosecution a distinct
advantage over the defendant: "The very structure and design of the courtroom works to
legitimate the prosecution ... " (83). Nunn, in tum, stresses the need to counterbalance
the state's authority when attempting to obtain just verdicts, but more on this later. The
Supreme Court of the United States has spoken on the issue through the words of Chief
Justice Warren. As quoted by Ball, Warren insists the courtroom:
is more than a location with seats for a judge, jury, witnesses, defendant,
prosecution, defense counsel and public observers; the setting . . . is itself an
important element in the constitutional conception of trial, contributing a dignity
essential to 'the integrity of the trial process (381 U.S. 532, 561 (1965, Warren,
C.J., concurring)).
For the_:!heater of the court, the stage facilitates the negotiations between the confluence
of state power and rights of the individual defendant. The structure is implicated in the
kind of justice that is dispensed. The promise of this relationship guides political theater
of the 1930s as well.
The audience-a second link between popular theater and trial-serves to
legitimate the production of justice. Ball reminds us that the right to a public trial is
protected by the Constitution: "The public not only monitors what happens in the
courtroom but may also help the active participants keep their perspective, thereby
prompting them to perform their proper roles" (86). Commentators such as Ball and
Gerhard 0. W. Mueller recognize the entertainment value of the trial; however, both
discuss the communal aspect of justice as represented by community participation:
"Popular justice is public justice-it is play with popular emotions while doing or
restoring right" (Mueller 6-7).

In the trial, the audience also includes the jury, a
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representation of community that makes the ultimate determinations of fact for the trial.
The right to a jury is a fundamental aspect of Anglo-American law and like the public
courtroom, the trial by jury is another constitutionally protected right for the criminal
defendant, further legitimizing the presence of the community as part of the production of
justice (U.S. Const. Art. III, §2; amend. VI; amend. VII). Ball points out that the jury
serves both as passive observers and as agents in the "trial event" (87).
Finally, American jurisprudence is founded on the notion of an adversarial system
whereby "protagonist and antagonist confront one another, present conflicting versions of
the past and establish a problem to be solved" (88). Nunn focuses heavily on this aspect
of the trial, which he terms "staging" (789).

For him, staging a trial between a

protago_f!ist and antagonist always places the government as the former, giving the state
an advantage over the antagonistic defendant: "Throughout the trial, the defense must
labor to contradict this established version of events, a version cloaked with the
credibility of the state" (798). Staging goes to the heart of the dramatic nature of the trial
because like the characters of a play, the roles have been established for the prosecution,
the defendant, and the judge. For Nunn, this structure will always produce justice that is
substantively flawed because guilt is defaulted. However, like any performative work,
the roles are not realized, and thus functionally non-existent, until the actors play out the
performance in space and· time. It is this "production of justice" that creates or destroys
legitimacy for the court, structured by law but understood through a kind of dialectic.
Turning now to the first Scottsboro trials, this understanding of the legal process
as a theatrical one highlights how procedural shortcomings undermined the production of
justice. The "theater of Scottsboro" served to destroy rather than support the legitimacy
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of the trial. This is not to say that the dramatic aspect of Scottsboro led to injustice, but
that there is a central instability inherent in the relationship of form to substance, of the
structure of the trial to the performance of justice. Each of the theatrical elements, which
are also constitutional elements, serves the purpose of establishing that fair trial, while
simultaneously creating the potential to subvert a fair trial in the course of production.
For example, the Scottsboro courthouse, the "stage" of the trial, was a "classicalrevival structure" with a protruding clock steeple and a set of stairs leading to a columned
entrance(Carter 12, 242). The building was set on a well-tended lawn apart from other
buildings and framed by "giant water oaks" (Carter 12, 242). Whether the imposing
structure served to advantage the prosecution or instill the dignity of justice is debatable;
Nunn, however, would argue that this stage immediately stacked the cards in favor of the
prosecution, legitimizing the state's power through imposing architecture and statesponsored monuments. More important, though, is that the stage was not limited to the
structure: the physical presence of the townspeople became an integral part of the set:
By 7 A.M. there were several thousand people clamoring for admission through
the National Guard picket lines ... the throng became so packed that many
moved to the roofs of surrounding buildings in order to get a better view ... Four
machine guns guarded the doors of the building and gave the scene the
appearance of a fort under siege.
(Carter 22)
Machine guns, guardsmen, and the "sea of white faces" described by one of the
defendants "decorated" the stage of the trial. Nevertheless, a petition for change of venue
was denied (Carter 24). The aesthetics of this stage do not comport with Justice Warren's
"integrity of the justice process." Rather, Nunn's fear that "the very structure and design
of the courtroom works to legitimate the prosecution" seems to have manifested itself
through the Scottsboro stage.
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Proceeding from this ominous setting, the audience of the trial failed in its critical
function of checking the authority of the state. The crowd outside-doubling both as
setting and audience-satisfied the constitutionally protected "public trial" requirement
ironically because of the historical context of populist justice that had run rampant in the
deep South prior to World War I and continued to lurk in the Thirties. Legal professor
Michael J. Klarman cites examples of law enforcement officers convincing lynch mobs to
cease and desist in exchange for the promise of quick trials and executions: "Prosecutors
sometimes appealed to juries on similar grounds, urging them to convict in order to
reward the mob for its good behavior and thus to encourage similar restraint in the
future" (Klarman 56). Thus, the audience supervised the state trial, but not in the way
anticipated by the Constitution. Likewise, the jury in Scottsboro was not a "jury of
peers." The defendants were black, out of work and young, while "eight of the jurors
were farmers, three merchants and one a mechanic-all were white" (Carter 24). L.
Friedman's description of San Benito quoted in a footnote of Ball's article is fitting:
No doubt citizens had ideas about fair trials and fair play and some pride in their
legal system; at the same time, they knew it cynically as a powerful weapon of
social control, a magnificent instrument for insuring power and wealth.
(Ball 87)
The audience in Scottsboro usurped the play by overstepping its role as observer and as
agent for dispensing justice. Instead, the audience fashioned justice through its forceful
presence and through verdicts unrelated to facts. For example, in the case of defendant
Roy Wright, the state did not seek the death penalty but asked only for life imprisonment.
Despite this, seven of the jurors still insisted on the death penalty (Carter 48). Circling
back, an internal conception of the law is simply not available with regards to the
Scottsboro trials. As Carter aptly points out, "The nine Negro boys had already been
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tried, found guilty, and sentenced to death by the news media" (20). The first Scottsboro
trials are an argument for both the inability of law to enjoy autonomy and a mandate for
attempting to maintain some form of legal autonomy.
The staging of the trial flowed naturally from the established stage and audience.
The prosecution, following the scripted procedure, began its case by calling Victoria
Price, one of the alleged victims of rape. Clothed in a new dress and "minus her usual
dip of snuff," Price gave a gruesome account of rape, following the prosecution's gentle
leash of questions (Carter 25).

When the defense rose to cross-examine, the

prosecution's script remained intact. The defense intended to discredit Price by showing
that she was a prostitute, but the court sustained objections to his line of questioning
(Carter_;26-27). After just two sustained objections, the defense rested (Carter 27). As
the trial progressed, the prosecution presented the problem (rape) to be solved (conviction
and death of defendants). The defense, on the other hand, back-pedaled from sustained
objections.

When it came time to present its own witnesses, the defense offered

defendant Weems to give his denial (Carter 33). The defense then offered defendant
Norris to buttress Weems' testimony; instead, Norris told the court that the other
defendants had raped the girls and that he alone was innocent. Not only had the defense
done nothing to contradict the prosecution's version of the events, they had added support
to that version. As the jury left to deliberate, "a selection of a venire to try the next case
began and within less than an hour, Haywood Patterson went on trial alone" (Carter 34).
The staging was furiously paced.
Reactions to the trial came in the form of legal and social commentary. Most
directly, the decision was appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court and then the United
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States Supreme Court. The decision of Powell v. Alabama 40 "started a revolution in
criminal procedure that eventually led ... to the incorporation into state law nearly all of
the criminal procedural protections set forth in the Bill of Rights" (Ross 592). The
United States Supreme Court began its opinion referring to the defendants as "Negroes"
and the victims as "white girls," thus immediately establishing the racial overtones. The
Court moved on to describe the procedural events, noting that the judge appointed "all
the members of the bar" of Scottsboro to represent the defendants, and that "each of the
three trials were completed within a single day" (Powell 49, 50). A lengthy summary of
the facts followed, and then the Court moved into its argument, "whether the defendants
were in substance denied the right of counsel, and if so, whether such denial infringes the
due prq<;ess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." At this point, the Court's argument
split into two parts.
One part of the analysis discussed the legal precedent and historical motivations
involved in the constitutionally protected right to adequate counsel with regards to
actions by the state, but the second part of the analysis reviewed the theater of the trial.
In this part, the Court responded to each element set forth above. It condemned the
setting: "the circumstances of public hostility, the imprisonment and the close
surveillance of the defendants by the military forces" (Powell 71). It then turned to the
audience: "the fact that their friends and families were all in other states and
communication with them was necessarily difficult" (Powell 71). However, it was with
the process that the Court spent most of its time: "they stood in deadly peril of their lives"
and "the failure of the trial court to give them reasonable time and opportunity to secure
counsel was a clear denial of due process" (Powell 71).
40

287

us 45 (1932)
34

In defending its decision to remand the case, the Court took pains to describe the
drama by which the defendants' counsel was selected, transcribing several pages from the
actual trial transcript, reproducing a "mini-drama" in its opinion. Reciting the dialogue
between the trial court and the potential lawyers, it became clear that the lawyers neither
expect to be sole counsel nor are prepared to act. The court concludes: "And in this
casual fashion the matter of counsel in a capital case was disposed of" (Powell 56). The
court continued its critique by contrasting the dramatic element-the casual fashionwith the imperative of constitutional due process: "There are certain immutable principles
of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the
Union may disregard" (Powell 71-72).

For the Court, due process was just such a

princip_l~.

The Court recognized "representation" as a "fundamental right."

The term

"representation," functioned as a synonym for legal counsel, but also functioned through
its broader definition "to stand for." Counsel became the initial signifier to the jury for
the defendant's innocence. The performance of that representative was key to the actual
production of the trial, and as such, was essential. The Court recognized the structural
deficiencies of the Scottsboro trial as deficiencies in the production of justice. The Court
declared, "The judgments must be reversed and the causes remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion," cementing the link between the Court's
judgment of the structure of the first Scottsboro trial, the concept of justice impaired by
that structure, and the formulation of the law (Powell 72). As Ross notes, "Powell was
one of several decisions during the 1920s and 1930s that marked the transition of the
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Supreme Court from its old role as primarily a protector of property rights to its modem
role as a guardian of personal liberties" (593).
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v.
THEY SHALL NOT DIE:
OLD PROBLEM, NEW RESPONSE
. . . [T]here was in the discovery of the idea of culture and its wide-scale
application a critical tool that could shape a critical ideal, especially as it was
directed repeatedly against the failures and meaninglessness of an urban-industrial
civilization. Yet often it was developed in such ways as to provide significant
devices for conserving much of the existing structure. A search for the "real"
America could become a new kind of nationalism; the idea of an American Way
could reinforce conformity. (Susman 164).

When the Scottsboro defendants returned to the Alabama courts, the stage, its
players and the scope of the trials themselves had all changed. The l.L.D. had secured
top criminal defense attorney, Samuel Liebowitz, to head the case; police had seized a
letter from Ruby Bates, one of the accusers, admitting the defendants were innocent; 41
Judge Hawkins 42 granted a motion for change of venue, removing the trial from the town
where the defendants had first been prosecuted; and finally, Judge Horton, the new trial
judge, set a sobering tone by warning vigilante groups against disturbing the trial
proceedings. 43 In addition, the trial court was aware that it worked under the gaze of the
Supreme Court, while national pressure grew for the release of the defendants. 44
Ironically, as the trial of Scottsboro spread from the elite legal culture to a larger
percentage of the popular culture, the theatre of Scottsboro moved from protest rallies

41

Dearest Earl
I want to make a statement to you Mary Sanders is a goddam [sic] lie about those negrose [sic] jassing
[sic]me those police man [sic] made me tell a lie ... those negros [sic] did not touch me ... i [sic] hope you
will belive [sic] me (Carter 186-87).
42
Judge Hawkins presided over the first Scottsboro trials.
43
"I say this much, that the man who would engage in anything that would cause the death of any of these
prisoners is not only a murderer, but a cowardly murderer, and a man whom we should look down upon
with all the contempt in our being; and I am going to say further that the soldiers here and the Sheriffs here
are expected to defend with their lives these prisoners, and if they must do it, listen gentlemen you have the
authority of this court, and this court is speaking with authority, the man who attempts it may expect that
his own life be forfeited, or the guards that guard them must forfeit their lives" (Linder, Famous).
44
For example, a group of marchers carried a petition with the signatures of 200,000 people to Washington
the previous spring (Brunner).
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and the agitprop stage to the more exclusive Broadway. This shift in the political theatre
of Scottsboro anticipates a conservative swing not only in the techniques of American
theatre

45

but also more generally in American popular culture. As national institutions

started the process of reform championed by the New Deal and culminating, 46 at least for
the institution of law, in the constitutional revolution of 1937, America's political theatre
actually "developed in such ways as to provide significant devices for conserving much
of the existing structure," articulating avenues by which the "idea of an American Way
could reinforce conformity" (Susman 164). This paper concludes with a look at how
Wexley's They Shall Not Die serves to "reinforce conformity" despite its effort to
instigate political change.
_:pnlike the rhythm-driven approach of Limited, Wexley employs naturalistic
docudrama in They Shall Not Die. Wexley seems familiar with the goals outlined by
Zola several decades earlier: "To increase the reality of our corpus of drama, to progress
towards truth, to sift out more and more of the natural man and impose him on the
public" (368).

They Shall Not Die gives stage directions that recreate the Alabama

setting using "real" props to give the illusion of reality-for example, the office space
contains a crank phone, a table fan, a medicine cabinet, and a water cooler (Wexley 155).
More importantly, Wexley uses lines from the actual transcripts of the trial under Judge
Horton, giving the play· the "endorsement" of "official reality." Through the use of
naturalistic docudrama, the play gives the impression that it will "sift out more and more

45

Ilka Saal describes the "aesthetic turn in proletarian literature," noting that the return to naturalism, the
use of empathy rather than alienation, and the return to Aristotelian conceptions of theatre marked "the
abandonment of high modernist techniques and the return to the mimetic principles of critical realism"
(326). For Saal, the conservative shift in American political theatre is marked by the Writers' Congress of
April 1935.
46
For a discussion on how the New Deal inspired additional reforms in terms of labor and free speech, see
Berman 291-321.
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of the natural man," as well as the corrupt system of justice prevalent in the South.
Wexley aims for a political effect by recreating the injustice of Scottsboro and forcing the
audience to observe passively while terrible-yet-preventable events unfold.
While the play is infused with naturalistic depictions and dialogue, Wexley
simultaneously highlights his recreation of the trial with the broad strokes of good and
evil, forcing the audience to align itself with the "good." This melodramatic deployment
of courtroom drama is exemplified in the conclusion of the play:
RUBIN: No, we're not finished. We're only beginning. I don't care how many
times you try to kill this Negro boy ... I'll go to the Supreme Court up in
Washington and back here again, and Washington and back again, if I have to do
it in a wheel-chair! And if I do nothing else in my life, I'll make the fair name of
this State stink to high heaven with its lynch justice ... These boys, they shall not
die!
(Wexley 152).

In this scene, defense attorney Rubin is not merely speaking for his client. The moment
marks the culmination of Rubin's transformation from the private criminal defense
attorney to the politically charged and radical spokesman for the Popular Front.
Wexley's ending deconstructs the trial in order to reconstruct a quasi-legal production or
"retrial." The conclusion is an effort to undermine institutionalized law through the
reformulation of the system on the stage of the cultural front: thus, the legal system,
rather than the Scottsboro defendant, is deemed guilty.
Yet, the conclusion marks a troubling paradox prevalent throughout They Shall
Not Die that serves to undermine the political call for reform. While the play arises from

the struggle of the Popular Front,47 it actually segregates the American population in
terms of race and class, ultimately championing the individual over the collective. To

47

Denning defines Popular Front in the United States as the "the social democratic electoral politics, the
politics of international solidarity, and the campaigns against lynching and labor repression" (14).

!

L______ - - - - -

39

I

begin, the passage cited above linguistically reinforces a transformation from "we" to "I"
that has larger, symbolic implications. The solitary voice of the white defense attorney
reaffirms the traditional power structure whereby this "paternal figure" becomes the
agent of power while the black defendant becomes the object of charitable action. The
lawyer's diatribe against the court begins with the inclusive, "we're not finished," but
quickly transforms into the first person: "I'll go to the Supreme Court ... ," "if I have to
do it in a wheel-chair ... ," "if I do nothing else ... ," and "I'll make the fair name ... "
(Wexley 152). The final "They shall not die" cements the separation between "we" and
"they," maintaining a fissure not between the Popular Front and corrupt institutions, but
between members of the Popular Front, themselves. The paramount struggle becomes
Rubin~~

struggle-he emerges heroically alone and sympathetically coupled with the

melodramatic image of the wheelchair. This is not the same fight as the one shouted in
Hughes's Limited-Rubin's shout is a retreat from that utopian reenactment of the trial.
The conservative disposition is further realized by the audience of They Shall Not

Die. First, the conclusion does not demand action from the audience as in Limited;
rather, as mentioned above, the fight is contained in the actions of a single player.
Wexley maintains the "fourth wall" condemned by proponents of more radical theatre in
the early part of the century, thus maintaining a physical, if not emotional, separation
between stage and audierice. 48 Second, the fact that the play was a Broadway production
no doubt limited the number people who could have afforded to attend such an expensive

Meyerhold and Brecht, for example, argued against theatrical te~hniques that ~isconnected the au~ience
from the production: "It is of course necessary to drop the assumption th~t th_ere 1~ a fourth ~all c~ttmg the
audience off from the stage and the consequent illusion that the stage act10n 1s takmg place m reality and
without an audience" (Brecht 136).
48
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affair in 1934. As playwright Clifford Odets wrote, "What's the sense in writing plays
for a few bourgeois intellectuals on Broadway at $3.30 a head?" (qtd. in Herr 75).
This paradox for political theatre operating on Broadway became a central
problem for groups like the Theatre Guild, who produced Wexley's play: "How [could] a
theatre produce high-quality drama if it was forced to operate on Broadway principles,
and how it could afford to survive if it didn't" (Herr 72). A more fundamental distinction
was emblematized by this "financial/quality" problem of Broadway. The question of
source of theatre proved a point of contention for players who eventually broke away
from the Guild to form the Group Theatre:
The Group was founded, moreover, on a significantly different concept of
democracy than was the Guild, as suggested by the names. The Guild, with its
_:conscious associations of a small collective of talented craftspeople producing a
useful object for others, is in striking contrast to the Group, which suggests a
conscious effort at unity rather than separation. (Herr 73-74).

They Shall Not Die seems to reflect the fundamental philosophy implicit in Guild
productions that promotes the elitist notion of "talented craftspeople" over an "effort at
unity." In struggling with the political relevance of Broadway theatre in the 1930s, Herr
argues that the paradox implicit in such theatre does not necessarily destroy its legitimacy
as an instrument of social change. For Herr, the duality of Broadway drama harkens back
to a duality fundamental to American democracy: the combination of a Puritan
individualism jealous of its personal rights, and a collective "folk spirit,"49 manifested in
the poems of writers such as Walt Whitman (66-67). Broadway, then, became a place
where the theatre negotiated between these seemingly conflicting norms.

49

For further discussion of the concept of "folk" as an inspiration for American artists between World War
I and II, see Reini-Grandell 120-23.
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Ultimately, though, Wexley's play suppresses the "folk spirit" in favor of a more
individualistic portrayal of democracy that reduces the "group" to particular stereotypes.
For example, Wexley employs spellings and phrasings such as "outpopulated an' beat up
them hobo kids," "These heah girls," and "Whut yuh tryin' tuh say" in order to recreate
the exact speech patterns and phrasings of a "Southerner." Yet, his characterizations
become caricatures. A stage direction calls for the scenery to give the audience "the
impression of a warm spring afternoon, of flies buzzing, of roaches and dirt, of sloth and
laziness" (14). At another point, he has a character "taking a bite of his tobacco plug" in
reaction to the comment "fifty niggers" (17). Another scene depicts a moment where the
solicitor's help is needed, but he is "sleepin"' (20). Finally, in the same act, the mob
speaks -~s a single voice: "Are the wimmin hurt bad, Sheriff? I We oughta git the Klan
together" (28). The signals meant to place the play in the South function by reducing a
group to a stereotype, ultimately leading to the condemnation of individuals of an entire
region based on those stereotypes. The irony is that Wexley employs the same pattern of
thinking in the service of justice that he ostensibly condemns in terms of racism.
Furthermore, his repetition of racial slurs serves to perpetuate their use.
It is difficult to see how this mode of thinking is problematic when used to

describe groups like the Klan. But Wexley's reductive "naturalism" is not limited to his
play's antagonists. In a· particular scene, a deputy brutally questions and intimidates
several defendants, and Wexley uses the moment to isolate his central theme of racial
hate and social injustice. The first defendant is kicked in the shin when he proclaims his
innocence, highlighting the farce of his arrests; a second defendant tells the deputy he
was on the way to Memphis to get surgery for his failing vision, creating empathy for this
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character (and anger at the deputy who summarily dismisses this explanation); a third
defendant gives his correct age of thirteen, but is forced by physical intimidation to give a
false age of sixteen, thus allowing him to be tried as an adult. The message is clear about
the corrupt nature of these arrests and the inhuman treatment of the defendants.
However, when the defendants speak they too fall into the stereotypical patterns that
pervade Wexley's text. Their words react to the deputy, but also serve to monolithically
define through phrases like "suh," and "Yassuh," and "Chattanoogie" instead of
"Chattanooga." The defendants are the "victims" of the play: a characteristic that serves
Wexley's political agenda by demanding that Rubin insist "They shall not die!" Yet, this
mode of writing immediately disempowers the defendants and lumps their identities into
the single unit of "Poor Black Southerner."
This is not to claim that the play's agenda of freeing the Scottsboro defendants is
not steeped in a kind of "folk spirit." There is a fundamental principle of justice at work
in the movement to "fight for Scottsboro" that invokes equality. However, where Hughes
invokes the folk spirit through vernacular music and maintains equality by giving the
black defendants agency, Wexley re-establishes the system of inequality through his very
efforts to fight it.
Ultimately, They Shall Not Die is "necessarily detached from reality, because it
negates its differences from reality" 50 (Adorno 77).

For Adorno, "The moment of

intention is mediated solely through the form of the work, which crystallizes into a
likeness of an Other that ought to exist" (93). Wexley's form threatens to destroy his
liberal stance in much the same way that the original Scottsboro trials destr6yed their
50

Quotation is from Adomo's essay "Commitment," and refers to the dilemma of committed works of art.
I recognize that the quote is taken slightly out of context in this essay, but it touches on a paradox inherent
in Wexley's project.
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legitimacy before the popular culture and ultimately before the United States Supreme
Court. By the summer of 1934, Scottsboro had once again moved through the trial court,
and the convictions of the defendants had been sustained by Alabama's Supreme Court. 51
The United States Supreme Court once again reversed the convictions, this time finding
that the jury selection committee systematically excluded black Americans from being
jurors. In other words, the Court once again reversed Jim Crow on procedural grounds,
and it did so based on a culturally informed conception of fundamental rights. The midThirties marked a progression toward a social middle ground: as Wexley's play suggests,
political theatre grew more conservative after the first fervent years of the Great
Depression in order to cater to a more middle class audience; conversely, the traditionminde4 .Court modified its strict-interpretational approach to the Constitution to give the
federal government greater flexibility in engineering social welfare.
L. Friedman argues that "the starting point of social change can be located in the

outer context: material and technological changes, natural disasters, and the like" (1585).
The social change implicit in the Scottsboro saga can likewise be measured by the outer
structure of both the legal procedures and cultural productions that the event inspired.
Changes in structure become clues to changes in popular and legal culture. Christopher
A. Bracey implicitly recognizes this idea in his brief review of the American criminal
process:

51

Norris v. State, 229 Ala. 226 (1934). Holding that defense did not meet their burden of proving that the
jury commissioners had discriminated based on race in selection of the jury list. In making this decision,
the court stated that the defendant had put "some farmers, others plasterers, dry cleaners, porters, janitors,
and some in the mercantile business, and others preachers," who possessed the necessary skills to be jurors
(Carter 233). Court argued that close examination showed their skill level to be merely opinion. The court
continued, quoting a white newspaper man who said "he knew some good negroes, with good reputations,
yet he would not be willing to say there were any that possessed the necessary qualifications for jury
service" (Norris 233-34). The court treated his statement with greater authority than the several witnesses
for the defense while simultaneously arguing race had not been a factor in jury selection.
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In absence of a legitimate moral authority to speak self-consciously about a
commitment to racial equality, in the vacuum of trust generated by exposure of
the lie of American democracy, American institutions sought moral redemption
through structural changes that would place strong limits on the ability of
majoritarian society to abuse authority and further compromise an already morally
suspect regime (Bracey 705)
Bracey continues, arguing that the changes instigated by the Supreme Court in criminal
procedure helped to "re-establish institutional legitimacy" (705).

Thus, structural

modifications allowed the Court to strengthen the institutional status quo incorporating
more aggressive approaches to civil and economic rights.

The shift from Hughes's

structurally radical agitprop to Wexley's more conservative and traditional Broadway
production suggests that traditional institutions were, in fact, re-establishing legitimacy
from a cultural standpoint by the mid-thirties. It is true that Wexley condemns the
injustice of the Alabama court; however, his spokesman, Rubin, promises to fight not
through some revolutionary overthrow of the entire legal system, but by using the
established appellate structure to institute change: "I'll go to the Supreme Court up in
Washington and back here again, and Washington and back again ... " (Wexely 152).
Rather than the destruction of the electric chair and the singing of the Internationale,
Wexley tacitly embraces a traditional mode for change, thus recognizing the moral
legitimacy of the general structure of the American legal system, if not the specific
Alabama legal institutions.
An important lesson from the Scottsboro trials is that merely the recognition of
structural flaws is never enough. The legacy of the Scottsboro trials continued to
undermine the American criminal justices system for decades following the Courts final
reversal in Norris. While the structural changes that allowed the federal courts to review
state decisions involving human rights eventually highlighted the path for reforming
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American jurisprudence, a true reformation was only possible decades after the
Scottsboro trials through concerted substantive efforts on legal, political and cultural
fronts.
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